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CONTEMPT OF COURT: THE MOST IMPORTANT
"CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGE TO JUDGING"
S FoRD LEVINSON*
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Judge Wilkinson's speeches, deliv-
ered as part of a program on "contemporary challenges to judging," are
fascinating. Given the ceremonial occasion, the dedication of a new wing
of the Washington and Lee Law School library housing the papers of Justice
Lewis Powell, one might well have expected traditional encomia to the law
and reiteration of conventional pieties about the strict separation between
law and politics. Instead the audience was privileged to hear candid talk
about the fragmentation-indeed, in Judge Wilkinson's word, the "polari-
zation"-characteristic of the contemporary legal universe. A key aspect of
this reality is an ever diminishing willingness to defer to judges as "oracles
of the law," in part because of the almost universal recognition that law
and politics are indeed inextricably intertwined.
Altogether typical of the contemporary mood is the remarkable state-
ment by Yale Law School Dean Guido Calabresi, in a column explaining
why he supported the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the United States
Supreme Court. "I despise the current Supreme Court," Calabresi wrote,
"and find its aggressive, willful, statist behavior disgusting. . . .", What is
so startling about Dean Calabresi's comment is not its sentiments, which
are widely shared at least within the legal academy, but his willingness to
say so publicly. Lest one think that only the "left ' 2 speaks harshly of a
conservative Court, one should be aware that denizens of the so-called New
Right, throughout the 1980s, attacked Justice Brennan, among other liberal
jurists, in terms suggesting that he simply had no respect for constitutional
values and willfully subordinated the Constitution to his own pernicious
political agenda. Indeed, Justice Scalia, in some of his dissents, seems to
think little better of some of his own current colleagues.
Many factors, of course, explain these developments. Law is only one
aspect of our more general cultural surround, and legal fragmentation amply
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This essay is based on some distinctly informal comments delivered as part of a panel
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1. Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TnsS, July 28, 1991, § 4,
at 15.
2. Though it is far more accurate to describe Calabresi as a "centrist" rather than a
"leftist," as evidenced by his support, however tepid, of the Thomas nomination.
3. See, e.g., his opinion in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 60 U.S.L.W.
4795, 4835 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
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reflects the divisions present in the wider social order. "Reflecting larger
fissures in society," Richard Posner has written, "the legal community is
politically and culturally divided." ' 4 Indeed, Posner suggests that "[n]ot
since the Civil War have the legal profession, the judiciary, and the
legislatures all been so diverse, politically and culturally.'" As the evocation
of the Civil War reminds us, it is simply foolhardy to assume that there is
anything magic about American constitutionalism that can necessarily save
us from the most traumatic political catastrophes.
The most basic contemporary challenge to judging, then, is gaining the
respect of the wider audience, particularly, of course, those who are dis-
satisfied with the particular outcomes of cases. Is there anything that Chief
Justice Rehnquist or Antonin Scalia can do to overcome Dean Calabresi's
contempt? One answer, of course, is to do what Justices Brennan and
Marshall (ultimately) did, which was to resign. That is scarcely a very
helpful answer, especially if their replacements would be appointed by
presidents like Ronald Reagan or George Bush, neither of whom has
exhibited the slightest interest in achieving a diversified (or, especially in
the case of Bush, even a distinguished) Supreme Court.
Part of what accounts for the present unhappiness is precisely the
widescale acceptance of the basic insights of Legal Realism, as accurately
delineated by the Chief Justice. He describes the so-called "oracular theory
of judging" by which "sound legal training in existing case law was all it
took to discover the rule of decision applicable to the case at hand." Then
comes perhaps the most important sentence of the entire talk: "The advent
of the Legal Realist School disabused us of that notion" (emphasis added).
What is crucial in this sentence is precisely the emphasized "us," for
Rehnquist makes no effort to relight the flame of the "oracular theory."
Indeed, he immediately goes on to say that "[flew," most certainly not
including the Chief Justice, "would now argue against the proposition that
judging involves creating law, at least to some extent."
What this means, among other things, is that it matters profoundly
which particular persons are appointed to the judiciary. One can no longer
cogently argue that some process of legal professionalism will be enough to
"bleach out" the specific identity, including political commitments, brought
to the bench by the judges. What this means, among other things, is that
it is extremely unlikely that the resolution to fragmentation lies in adopting
one or another of the various hermeneutic approaches-whether original
intent, pragmatism, or whatever-proffered (or preferred) by legal academ-
ics. An announced adherence to one of these notably abstract theories of
interpretation will have, I strongly suspect, no more than the slightest impact
on the actual results reached in the cases presented to the Supreme Court
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 203 (1990).
5. Id. at 296. See also Sanford Levinson, Strolling Down the Path of the Law (And
Toward Critical Legal Studies?): The Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, 91 COLum. L. REv.
1221, 1233-35 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, Tim PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990)).
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for decision. Far more important are the basic political and social sensibilities
of the judges. As Felix Frankfurter pointed out many years ago, it is a
"mischievous assumption that our judges embody pure reason. ' 6 Instead,
he wrote, "the nine Justices are molders of policy," and "the 'Constitution'
which they 'interpret' is to a large measure the interpretation of their own
experience, their 'judgment about practical matters,' their 'ideal pictures of
the social order.' ' 7 As already suggested, I have no reason to think that
Chief Justice Rehnquist would seriously disagree with the basic outline of
this analysis, whatever our likely disagreements about who should actually
be appointed to the judiciary.
Can anything more be said about the appointment process, though?
Let me offer two suggestions, both of them predicated on accepting the
basic outlines of Chief Justice Rehnquist's legal realism. The first relates
to lifetime tenure on the Court. I think this is a practice whose time has
gone and, indeed, that seriously disserves the nation in a number of
important ways. One of them is that it, indeed, tends to freeze on the
Court the "ideal pictures" of outdated, and perhaps electorally repudiated,
governing coalitions. We certainly saw this during the pre-1937 period when
conservative justices resolutely stood against legislative reforms sparked by
the Depression and the New Deal. But liberals must recognize that some of
their heroes (and, to be honest, my heroes as well), such as Justices Brennan
and Marshall, may also have stayed too long at the fair, succeeding mainly
in building up resentment on the part of their ideological opponents.
Moreover, lifetime tenure, coupled with explicitly ideological appointing,
results in the perverse incentive to appoint young judges. The justice whose
career sparked this symposium, Lewis Powell, was appointed to the Court
when he was 63, and he served 16 years. It is, alas, simply unthinkable
that any President today would appoint anyone that old, because 16 years
is viewed as "too short." Instead we get, as the most egregious example
(for a variety of reasons), Clarence Thomas, who may well be on the Court
for over 35 years. But one of the ostensible attractions, at least to the
appointment presidents, of Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and David
Souter as well was their relative youth and, thus, prospects for three decades
of service to conservative political ideals, regardless of future developments
in the wider political culture.
What, then, is the solution to lifetime tenure? It is, I believe, to appoint
Supreme Court justices for single, non-renewable terms of 18 years.' Why
6. Felix Frankfurter, Book Review, New Republic, April 23, 1924 (reviewing ANDREw
A. BRUCE, THE AismuicA JUDGE (1924)), reprinted in Faux FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME
COURT: EXmAUDICIL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTON 150 (Philip B. Kurland
ed., 1970).
7. Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes' Constitutional Opinions, 36
HAtv. L. Ray. 909 (1923), reprinted in, F.aux FRANIKyuRTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 6, at 119-20.
8. This suggestion was initially made about five years ago in a column in the Wall
Street Journal that- I unfortunately did not save.
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18 years? The answer is simple: Eighteen is divisible by nine, so that a new
appointment would be made every two years. This has the advantage,
among other things, of preventing any single president from making a
majority of full-term appointments, though a political party that did indeed
capture three consecutive presidencies, and had sufficient ideological support
in the Congress, could indeed name a majority of justices.
Once one accepts the basic insight of legal realism, it simply makes no
sense to appoint justices for a lifetime. Any concerns about judicial inde-
pendence can be allayed by paying full-salary pensions at the conclusion of
the 18-year term. Nothing else should be necessary. Former justices could
continue to serve the nation in a number of ways other than continued
membership on the Supreme Court.
A second suggestion relates to the background sought in nominees for
the Court. I offer it not as some kind of nostrum for our divisions, but
rather simply as a corrective to what I think is an especially unfortunate
aspect of the contemporary Supreme Court and at least one factor contrib-
uting to the contempt that many citizens feel for it. Notably absent on the
current Supreme Court is anyone with an impressive electoral career prior
to judicial appointment, or even a particularly impressive career of service
at the highest levels of American politics. If we are, for better or worse,
going to continue to count on the Supreme Court to display a necessary
political wisdom in its decisions, then we should make a greater effort to
appoint judges who have offered some evidence of possessing such wisdom.
Consider, for example, the members of the 1954 Supreme Court that
handed down Brown v. Board of Education. The Chief Justice, Earl Warren,
had been an immensely popular governor of what was then the third-largest
state and a candidate for the Vice-Presidency on the Republican ticket in
1948. Indeed, he owed his appointment to his having been a legitimate
candidate for the Presidency in 1952, a candidacy he abandoned in favor
of Dwight Eisenhower. Other justices included three former senators (Hugo
Black, Sherman Minton, and Harold Burton); two of the leading legal
academics of their time (Felix Frankfurter and William 0. Douglas, both
of whom were also involved at the highest levels of the Roosevelt Admin-
istration during the New Deal); two former Solicitors General (Robert
Jackson and Stanley Reed); and two former Attorneys General (Jackson
and Tom Clark).
Compare the current Court. The blunt fact is that not a single one of
its members had, before appointment, compiled a record of public service
equal to any member of the 1954 Court. It is perhaps startling to realize
that the current Justice closest in pre-appointment achievement to even the
least distinguished member of the 1954 Court is the aforementioned Clarence
Thomas, who had at least been head of an important federal agency prior
to his appointment to the United States Court of Appeals. Only Justice
O'Connor, among the current members of the Court, has ever experienced
campaigning for (and being elected to) public office. And it is obvious to
anyone observing her career that her particular vision of the Constitution
has been profoundly affected by her service in the Arizona legislature.
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It would be naive in the extreme to argue that contempt of court would
be assuaged by the appointment of, say, former Governor of California
George Dukemajian or Senator Orrin Hatch. (I leave it up to my readers
to imagine analogues to the entire 1954 Court.) 9 The country may, as Judge
Wilkinson suggests, simply be too polarized to view any set of appointees
as possessing sufficient political wisdom to make authoritative decisions in
regard to the kind of issues we present the judiciary for resolution. But is
a Supreme Court composed of relative nonentities, devoid of practical
experience in the arts of political negotiation and compromise-and devoid
as well of displays of political courage like that of Lewis Powell in regard
to desegregation in Richmond-likely to command general public respect?
The question answers itself.
Events since the early April 1992 gathering in Lexington have only
underscored the extent to which some basic assumptions about American
politics are being challenged. A man without significant political experience,
reminiscent of a "man on horseback," is currently leading the presumptive
presidential candidates of the two major parties in a number of major
states, and it is altogether thinkable as I edit these remarks (in late June)
that the next President of the United States will be chosen by the House
of Representatives (and the next Vice-President by the Senate). With the
collapse of the Cold War, more calls for perestroika can be heard in our
own country as well. There is simply no reason to believe that the waves
of anger directed at the presidency and the Congress will not reach the
judiciary as well. As noted at the outset, Dean Calabresi undoubtedly speaks
for millions of Americans in his expression of contempt of court. We should
address the underlying causes of this contempt. To pretend that it will
simply go away or otherwise benignly tolerated (perhaps like the federal
debt?) is irresponsible. The contemporary challenge facing judges is, indeed,
a challenge facing all of us as citizens concerned about the future of our
polity.
9. Nor do I want to argue that the Supreme Court is not well served by having some
members who have judicial experience, particularly at the trial court level (which is sorely
lacking in an otherwise jude-dominated court).
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